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Law-Making Responsibility and
Statutory Interpretationt
WILLIAM D. POPKIN*

INTRODUCTION
The explosion of commentary about statutory interpretation in the 1980s has
left judges without a common method for interpreting statutes. Text-, writer-,
and reader-based approaches all have some credibility This Essay suggests
a common framework for analyzing these approaches to statutory interpretation within which they can be understood and their differences debated. That
framework views all approaches to statutory interpretation as decisions about
law-making responsibility
I. INTERPRETIVE METHOD
Writer-based approaches treat statutes as expressions of the legislative
writer's will and look for evidence of legislative intent beyond that found in
the text. Text-based approaches treat statutes as text adopted through
constitutional procedures and stick as closely as possible to the statutory
language. There is also considerable variety within writer- and text-based
approaches. Two writer-based approaches-traditional legal process and
contemporary public choice-make very different demands on the judge.'
Text-based approaches also call for different judicial responses, ranging from
the ideal drafter's approach to grammar and style to genuine attempts at
understanding what a text means. 2
Writer- and text-based approaches share a common "Article I"' perspective,
tracing statutory meaning exclusively to the legislature-either by following
legislative will or statutory text. Reader-based approaches lack this democratic
pedigree. They treat statutes as material out of which the judicial reader
makes sense. These methodologies are "Article iir 'a approaches to determining statutory meaning, resting judicial authority on an independent judicial
t © Copyright 1993 by William D. Popkin. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington. I am grateful for comments
on an earlier draft from Harry Pratter, Lauren Robel, David Williams, and Susan Williams.
I. See mnfra text accompanying notes 22-34.
2. See mnfra text accompanying notes 35-50.
3. Hence, the "Article I" charactenzation refers to the first article of the U.S. Constitution, which
vests all legislative powers in Congress. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1.
4. "Article III" refers to the third Article of the U.S. Constitution, which vests the judicial power
of the United States in federal courts. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I. Whether state court judges are more
willing to adopt reader-based approaches, either because they are (in some cases) elected officials, or
because separation of powers concerns are less weighty for them than for federal judges, is beyond the
scope of this Essay.
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power. Reader-based approaches also vary, ranging from dynamic "updating"
interpretation 5 to a more eclectic "pragmatism." 6
The confusion over statutory interpretation contrasts with the three other
major branches of law- common law, administrative law, and constitutional
law Judges know pretty much how to decide a common-law case. They are
sensitive to precedent, dictum, holding, and the evolution of principle.

Administrative law also has an organizing principle-procedural rule-making
norms-that legislation lacks. The U.S. Constitution requires very few
procedures for making federal statutes;7 Congress is free to disregard the
procedural rules it adopts for itself;8 and constitutional rationality require9
ments impose very weak deliberation standards on Congress.
Constitutional law seems to have the most affinity with statutory law
because it is a written source of law imposed on courts. Many of the same
disputes about legal method arise: what is the role of original intent, of the
original meaning of the text, and of the contemporary values discerned by the
judge? Despite the wide range of approaches to constitutional interpretation,

the Constitution has a unity which statutes lack. To be sure, constitutional
provisions vary in the extent to which they evolve or are bound to their
specific histories. But the variety of statutory subject matter imparts to
statutory interpretation a disunity that has no parallel in constitutional
adjudication.
This Essay adopts an Article III reader-based approach to statutory
interpretation, which posits that all law-whether or not it originates in
statutes-filters through the judicial decision-making process about where

5. See T. Alexander Alemikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation,87 MICH. L. REv. 20 (1988);
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987).
6. See generally Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragmatism in American Legal Thought, 63
S. CAL. L. REV. 1569 (1990).
7. By contrast, state constitutions impose many procedural requirements on state legislatures. See
William D. Popkin, The CollaborativeModel of StatutoryInterpretation,61 S. CAL. L. REv. 541, 55359 (1988).
Procedures required by the U.S. Constitution are justiciable. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores,
495 US. 385 (1990) (revenue-raising bills must originate in the House). State constitutional
requirements are also justiciable unless the state follows the enrolled bill rule. 1 SUTHERLAND STATUTES
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 15.03 (L. Dallas Sands ed., 4th ed. 1972).
8. Metzenbaum v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 675 F.2d 1282, 1287-88 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(holding that the legislature can disregard its own rules).
9. See, e.g., United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980) (stating that the
Court "historically [has] assumed that Congress intended what it enacted"). But cf.Schweiker v. Wilson,
450 U.S. 221 (1981) (demonstrating that majority and dissent are both concerned with congressional
awareness when statute harms residents of public mental institutions; majority refers to Congress's
deliberate, considered choice, id. at 235-37; dissent requires a higher standard ofjudicial review if the
only evidence of legislative purpose is found in post hoc litigating position, id. at 243-45).
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law-making responsibility lies. Writer- and text-based approaches are best
understood as taking different positions about the respective law-making
responsibilities of legislatures and courts and the circumstances under which
that responsibility exists. When a court deals with a statute, the judicial reader
asks whether evidence of legislative intent and the statutory text discharges
the legislature's law-making responsibility or whether the court has a
responsibility to consider additional evidence of statutory meaning.
The language of law-making responsibility contrasts with the conventional
rhetoric of legal power, implying that courts have either (1) unlimited power
within an appropriate sphere of activity or (2) only that power derived from
a superior legislative authority Neither implication captures the Article III
perspective on statutory interpretation. A court's relationship to statutes is not
the same as a common-law court's relationship to the common law Statutes
are not as malleable as common-law precedents. But neither is a court's
relationship to a statute defined exclusively by what the legislature has done.
Theories of judging, not just expressions of legislative will, determine the
extent to which statutory material confines the judge. More specifically, the
judge's responsibility to struggle with the statute in the context of deciding
cases necessarily implies a law-making function beyond that which the
legislature grants."0
The Article III law-making responsibility perspective on statutory interpretation has two major characteristics and, I would argue, advantages. First, it
explains how all interpretive approaches, even those that are writer- and textbased, result from the exercise of judicial law-making choice. Second, the
rhetoric of "responsibility" focuses the judge's attention on how interpretive
choices should be made, reminding the judge that the choice is a responsible
act.
Part II of this Essay deals with the writer-based approaches, legislative
purpose and public choice. Part III discusses the text-based approaches,
surface textualism and plain meaning. Part IV suggests additional ways a
judge might exercise law-making responsibility- plain statement rules and the
legislative reenactment and inaction doctrines.

10. See John Choon Yoo, Marshall'sPlan: The EarlySupreme Courtand Statutory Interpretation,
I01 YALE L.J. 1607, 1630 n.135 (1992) ("The plenary power to decide rules of interpretation seems to
draw its roots from the Marshall Court's suggestion that certain powers inhere in the courts qua
courts. ).
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WRITER-BASED APPROACHES

A. Legislative Purpose
The dominant view throughout much of the twentieth century has been that
statutes embody the legislative writer's public purposes. Roscoe Pound
articulated this view in his seminal 1908 article, Common Law and Legislation." Its best-known judicial advocates were Learned Hand and Felix
Frankfurter. Judge Hand argued that
it is true that the words used, even in their literal sense, are the primary,
and ordinarily the most reliable, source of interpreting the meaning of any
writing
But it is one of the surest indexes of a mature and developed
jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary; but to remember
that statutes always have some purpose or object to accomplish, whose
sympathetic
and imaginative discovery is the surest guide to their
12
meaning.
Justice Frankfurter cautioned that
[t]he notion that because the words of a statute are plain, its meaning is
also plain, is merely pernicious oversimplification. . A statute, like other
living organisms, derives significance and sustenance from its environment,
from which it cannot be severed without being mutilated. Especially is this
true where the statute, like the one before us, is part of a legislative
process having a history and a purpose."
Neither Hand nor Frankfurter completely neglected the text. As noted above,
Learned Hand viewed the text as, ordinarily, the most reliable source of
meaning. He also noted "that as the articulation of a statute increases, the
room for interpretation must contract."' 4 Justice Frankfurter rejected the view
that statutory meaning was an "unexpressed spirit outside the bounds of the

11. Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REv. 383, 385-86, 407 (1908)
(advocating reasoning by analogy from statutory pnnciples).
12. Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945); see also Gregory
v. Helvenng, 69 F.2d 809, 810-11 (2d Cir. 1934) ("[T]he meaning of a sentence may be more than that
of the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes
"), aft'd, 293 U.S. 465 (1935); Learned
Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L.J. 167, 171 (1947) ("[The judge's task] is no less than to decide
how those who have passed the 'enactment' would have dealt with the 'particulars' before [the judge],
about which they have said nothing whatever.").
13. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also
Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381, 389 (1939) ("It is not a textual problem;
for Congress has not expressed its will in words.").
14. Gregory, 69 F.2d at 811. Despite the statutory detail, however, Judge Hand denied tax benefits
sought by the taxpayer in Gregory by invoking the statute's purpose that corporate readjustments must
have a business purpose.
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normal meaning of words."" Purpose was, however, the dominant partner
in the purpose-text relationship. Text was evidence of purpose and had an
interpretive veto, but purpose animated the judge's view of statutory meaning.
The writer-based purposive view of statutes peaked in the 1958 Hart and
Sacks Legal Process materials.16 Their recipe for statutory interpretation can
be summed up as follows: (1) "[d]ecide what purpose ought to be attributed
to the statute," 17 but "not
in the mood of a cynical political observer
[who takes] account of all the short-run currents of political expedience that
swirl around any legislative session"; (2) "unless the contrary unmistakably
appears, [assume] that the legislature was made up of reasonable persons
pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably"; 9 (3) let the words in historical
context serve both as guides to identifying purpose and as limits on the
meanings that can be attributed; and (4) do not give the
words a meaning that
20
violates "any established policy of clear statement.
The Legal Process approach requires a shared legislative/judicial lawmaking responsibility The statutory text and legislative purpose provide the
raw material, confining but not defining how a court interprets a statute.
Statutory purpose is not an easily identified fact; the judge must "decide what
purpose ought to be attributed to the statute. "21 Moreover, the limiting effect
of the text on statutory meaning is itself a function of how judges understand
the text's potential meanings in light of the ought-to-be-attributed purpose.
B. Public Choice
Intellectual syntheses have a way of crumbling soon after their dissemination, and that is what happened with Legal Process. The assumption of
reasonable legislative purposes collapsed under pressure from the "public

15. Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, 322 U.S. 607, 617 (1944). Justice Frankfurter continued:
We should of course be faithful to the meaning of a statute. But after all Congress
expresses its meaning by words. If legislative policy is couched in vague language, easily
susceptible of one meaning as well as another in the common speech of men, we should
not stifle a policy by a pedantic or grudging process of construction. To let general words
draw nourishment from their purpose is one thing. To draw on some unexpressed spirt
outside the bounds of the normal meaning of words is quite another.

Id.
16. HENRY HART & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCEss: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tentative ed. 1958).
17. Id. at 1411.
18. Id. at 1414-15.
19. Id. at 1415.
20. Id. at 1411.
21. Id. (emphasis added).
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choice" perspective on statutes. Public choice relies on an empirical model of
legislation which leads to the conclusion that there is no legislative purpose
from which courts can reason. Professor, now Judge, Frank Easterbrook relied
on three "public choice" ideas to reach this conclusion. First, there is no
legislative purpose because there are only indeterminate results made
determinate through legislative agenda control.22 Second, legislation is the
result of compromise, without energizing purpose. A statute does not merely
have direction (purpose), but also length, limited by the political interests
which compromised to produce the statute.23 Third, statutes result from
private-interest bargaining in a public forum.24
Like all generalizations about legislative intent, the empirical assumptions
of the public choice model are often inaccurate. Its hard-nosed view of
legislation may be no more correct than a "naive" legal process view that
statutes are animated by a public purpose. Advocates of the public choice
model tend to find the facts predicted by the model. Here are two examples.
First, Easterbrook presumes that private interest rent seeking explains the
prohibition of investment banking by commercial banks. 2' But an exhaustive
study of the statutory history by Donald Langevoort could not uncover
supporting evidence.26 Second, Easterbrook cites approvingly a Supreme
Court decision that rejected tort liability for a general contractor who
purchased workers compensation, because it enforces the statutory compromise that employers accept no-fault workers' compensation in exchange for
eliminating tort liability 27 However, as the dissent in that case noted, 2s the
Court extended the statute to someone who was not a part of the original
legislative bargain. The general contractor was not required by law to buy
workers' compensation unless the subcontractor refused, and the general
contractor purchased workers' compensation only because it could do so more
cheaply than the subcontractor.29
The empirical assumptions of the public choice model are necessary but not
sufficient to determine the allocation of law-making responsibility between

22. Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHi. L. REv. 533, 547-48 (1983).
23. In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987).
24. Frank H. Easterbrook, Foreword: The Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REv. 4,
14-18, 44, 54 (1984).
25. Id. at 57-58.
26. Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the JudicialProcess: The Revisionist Role
of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REv. 672, 691-98 (1987).
27. Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 54 n.132 (discussing Washington Metro. Area Transit Authority
v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 925 (1984)).
28. Johnson, 467 U.S. at 941-42, 945 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 928-29.
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legislatures and courts. Even if the public choice model provided a completely
accurate picture of the legislative process, a pre-empincal decision about lawmaking responsibility determines whether courts should use that model to
interpret statutes. Easterbrook is very explicit about the pre-empirical
assumptions which underlie the public choice approach to statutory interpretation. These assumptions, in equal degree, prefer legislative law making and
reject judicial law making. Easterbrook argues that the judicial re-creation of
legislative purpose impinges on legislative law-making responsibility by, in
effect, extending the legislature's life and making law without adhering to the
constitutional requirement of passage by both houses of Congress and
presentment to the President. 3' Additionally, Easterbrook rejects judicial law
making on its own merits, because it places too much strain on judicial ability
to re-create historical purpose in a contemporary setting.3'
The public choice approach is not, however, single-mindedly opposed to
judicial law making. A court considers two factors in deciding whether it can
make law First, a detailed text blocks further judicial exploration of
legislative intent because the text is presumed to be the product of a
legislative bargain.32 Second, an unclear text sends the court on a search in
the legislative history for an underlying legislative bargain.33 If the text is
precise or there is a constraining legislative bargain, there is no expansive
legislative purpose for the court to apply However, if an unclear text is not
confined by a legislative bargain, the statute "plainly hands courts the power
to create and revise a form of common law
The willingness to accept
judicial law-making responsibility establishes the public choice approach as
"moderate" on the question of judicial role. As a theory based on legislative
intent, public choice accepts (though reluctantly) the legislature's decision to
authorize judicial law making. A legislature can therefore discharge its lawmaking responsibility by delegating authority to the court.
"-3'

30. Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 548-49.
31. Id. at 550-51.
32. Id. at 545-57.

33. See, e.g., Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 321-24 (1984) (noting that statute
refers to activity "directly affecting the coastal zone," but that legislative history indicating a
compromise to exclude activity on Outer Continental Shelf narrows the statute's coverage); cf.Board
of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 187, 191-92 (1982) (noting that statute requires "appropriate
education" for the handicapped, but that legislative history limits judicial discretion in applying the law;

the history reveals statutory purpose of providing meaningful access to education, not development of
child's full potential).
34. Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 544.
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III. THE TEXT
Textualism comes in two very different guises, based on two very different
conceptions of law-making responsibility First, "surface textualism" relies on
grammar and style and is not genuinely concerned with how people communicate. The text is not so much an affirmative communication of legislative
meaning as it is a repository of words whose meaning depends on an ideal
drafter's set of rules. It is therefore a headlong flight from judicial law
making, rather than an affirmative vision of the legislature's responsibility for
making law Second, the plain meaning approach is concerned with how
people communicate through text. It looks for what the legislative writer and
statutory audience are likely to share about the meaning of words and
therefore rests on an affirmative conception of the legislative law-making
responsibility, albeit one that is discharged by the text.
A. Surface Textualism
Surface textualism interprets a statute in light of an ideal drafter's
conception of grammar and style. Despite protestations that this implements
"natural" usage," surface textualism is not genuinely concerned with the
meaning of language shared by writer and audience. Instead, it remains on the
surface of the document, imposing standards of grammar and style without
regard for the common understanding of language. The pre-textual assumption
of surface textualism is the rejection of judicial law making. The text is the
law, not for the purpose of deferring to plain meaning or to what a life-andblood legislature wants, but to avoid judicial responsibility 36 It is the
Pontius Pilate school of judging.
Surface textualism's lack of concern for how people really understand
language is most apparent when the judge treats the entire body of statutory
law as an integrated super text, by assuming that the same word has the same
meaning throughout the statutory code. That assumption violates the
conditions required for applying the plain meaning approach to language.

35. See Sullivan v. Everhart, 494 U.S. 83, 90 (1990) ("[I]t would have been more natural to refer
to 'the correct amount of any payment."); Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S.
120, 126 (1989) (implying that anything other than consistent usage of phrase in the statute would be
"unnatural"); Church of Scientology v. IRS, 792 F.2d 153, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1986) ("Such an intent would
but in the body of the definition
),
more naturally have been expressed not in an exclusion
aff'd, 484 U.S. 9 (1987).
36. This may explain why a surface textualist like Justice Scalia also rejects judicial law making
by adopting a super-deferential approach to agency rulemaking when the text is unclear. See INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453-55 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Sullivan, 494
U.S. at 89-93 (Scalia, J.).
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Meaning is plain when writer and audience share an understanding about the
text's meaning (hence, "common understanding" is a synonym for "plain
meaning"). But shared meaning occurs only when the writer and audience
treat the document(s) as an integrated whole. Absent that condition, the writer
and audience might not share a set of common assumptions about how the
statutory language is understood. The audience may assume one thing and the
writer another about the text's meaning, like two Peerless ships" passing in
the night."i
The writer's and audience's understanding of language might diverge either
because the document is a multi-part public law, drafted by different
committees, or because public laws are written at different times. The mere
fact that the text is codified in the same place does not guarantee a common
origin. A judge could, of course, insist on treating material codified in the
same place as if it were an integrated document to protect an audience's
reliance interest or to force more careful drafting. Such insistence is, however,
a reader-based approach, interpreting a statute to achieve important public
values, not to implement the plain meaning shared by author and audience.
Two cases involving income maintenance illustrate how a surface textualist
analyzes two public laws, codified in the same place, as an integrated
document. In Sullivan v. Stroop,3 9 the Court dealt with 1984 amendments to
Title IV-A of the Social Security Act,4" which permitted the disregard of
"child support" in computing a welfare family's income. The disregard
mitigated the hardship resulting from the 1984 adoption of automatic inclusion
of the child's income in the computation of family wealth and the consequent
reduction of AFDC benefits. The Court limited "child support" to parental
support, ruling out disregard of Social Security payments to benefit the child.
Another and earlier enacted section of the statute, Title IV-D,4 dealt with
enforcing "child support" from absent parents. Obviously, "child support" in
Title IV-D referred only to parental support. The Court concluded that "child
support" in the more recent (1984) Title IV-A and the earlier Title IV-D had
the same meaning, relying in part on the interpretive pnnciple that the same
phrase had the same meaning throughout the law, 42 even though the provisions had been drafted at different times for different purposes. The Court

37. Raffles v. Wichelhaus, 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (1864).
38. In the case In re Wagner, 808 F.2d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 1986), Judge Posner rejected
interpretation based on the assumption of a master drafter.

39. 496 U.S. 478 (1990).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(8)(A)(vi) (1988).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-667 (1988).
42. Stroop, 496 U.S. at 484.
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adopted a super-text approach, requiringan interpretation that treated the two
laws as an integrated document.
In Sorenson v Secretary of Treasury,43 the Court interpreted the word
"overpayment" as it was used in the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act."' The Act provided for intercepting refunds of tax "overpayments" owed
by the Internal Revenue Service to a father who was delinquent in making
child-support payments, and turning the funds over to the state that had
previously supported the child. The 1981 intercept provision for "overpayments" appeared in the Internal Revenue Code right after the rules adopted in
1975, which provided for payment of an earned income credit to poor families
based on a percentage of earnings. The earned income credit was paid to
workers in the form of a refund for an "overpayment." This "overpayment"
was not limited to cases where the credit reduced tax obligations below prior
withholding of income taxes from wages. The "overpayment" could be created
by pretending that the credit equaled previously withheld taxes, even though
the worker's earnings were insufficient to create tax liability in the first place.
The Court defined the "overpayment" for purposes of the 1981 intercept
provision to include all "refunds" attributable to the earned income credit
(whether or not they resulted from actual tax withholding), because the same
intercept "overpayment" language was codified in the same section of the tax
code that provided pretend "refunds" of the earned income credit.4" The
super-text approach prevailed. But the 1975 and 1981 provisions served
different purposes. One encouraged low-income workers to work, and the
other helped the state recoup welfare costs from obligated fathers. As Justice
Stevens noted in dissent in Sorenson, it defied belief to think that Congress
realized that the 1981 intercept provision, in a vast, hurriedly enacted omnibus
statute, changed the earned income credit program.46

43. 475 U.S. 851 (1986).
44. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 2331, 95 Stat. 357, 860-61
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
45. Sorenson, 475 U.S. at 863-64 (stating that it "defies belief to argue that Congress [i]s unaware"
of similar wording). Other recent cases treating the body of statutory law as a super text include Morales
v. Trans World Airlines, 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2037 (1992) (interpreting "relating to" the same way in airline
regulation law as in ERISA), and West Virginia Umv. Hosp. v. Casey, I1I S. Ct. 1138 (1991)
(interpreting statute not referrng to expert's costs differently from statutes referring to both attorney's
fees and expert's costs).
46. Sorenson, 475 U.S. at 867 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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B. Plain Meaning Textualism
Plain meaning textualism is very different from surface textualism. It relies
on the meaning of language shared by the legislative writer and statutory
audience, not on an ideal drafter's conception of grammar and style. It rests
on an affirmative vision of legislative law-making responsibility, not on
rejection of judicial law making, although its focus on the text allows less
scope for judicial law making than a writer-based legislative purpose
approach. The pre-textual political theory justifying deference to plain
meaning is that law-making responsibility is exhausted by the text; the
legislature is responsible for telling the judge if it wants something different
from the text's plain meaning.
The plain meaning approach has trouble surviving in today's legal
environment. First, surface textualism has given it a bad name. Second, plain
meaning occurs much less often than judges let on. A meaning is plain only
if a writer and audience have a common understanding of textual meaning.
However, there is often more than one plausible audience for a text, at least
one of which has a different understanding from the legislative writer.
"Family" means one thing in traditional usage and another thing in the gay
community;47 "mother" can refer to biological or birth mother;"i "race" can
refer historically to ethnicity, whatever it might mean today 49 Still, there
often is a plain meaning about which author and audience agree. (Tomatoes
are vegetables, as long as the audience is not a group of botanists.50 ) In such
cases, the plain meaning has a strong claim to exhaust the meaning of the
statute.
Despite plain meaning, however, the application of the text to the facts of
a case may look strange, testing the strength of the plain meaning approach.
The judge must then decide whether the legislature has the responsibility to
write the text to prevent strange results, or whether the judge has the
responsibility to decide the case other than in accordance with plain meaning.
The criteria for making that choice are illustrated by the following three
47. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). But see Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572

N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (holding that "parent" does not include lesbian ex-partner for visitation rights
purposes).
48. Anna J. v. Mark C., 234 Cal App. 3rd 1557 (Ct. App. 199 1),petitionfor review granted and
opinion superseded, 822 P.2d 1317 (Cal. 1992).
49. Saint Francis College v. AI-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 610-12 (1987) (noting that in the 19th
century "race" referred to ethnic groups such as Germans and Arabs); Shaare Tefila Congregation v.
Cobb, 481 U.S. 615, 617 (1987) (holding that Jewish plaintiffs can bring a cause of action under 42
U.S.C. § 1982 because Jews were considered part of a distinct race when the statute was passed).
50. Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893).
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situations: (1) a drafting error; (2) changing circumstances which make
historical plain meaning seem odd; and (3) absurd results. The central
organizing principles are these. Legislatures have two major responsibilities:
to convey meaning in language and to address political issues. A judge must,
first, decide whether law-making responsibility is discharged by the text or
whether the judge can look further; and, second, if the judge can look further,
whether the political issues require legislative rather than judicial resolution.
1. Drafting Errors and Drafting Responsibility
In United States v. Locke,"' the Court dealt with a federal statute enacted
to rid federal lands of stale mining claims by requiring the recording of
ownership with the Bureau of Land Management. The statute required the
claimant to file "prior to December 31." This was a drafting error. Congress
meant to say "on or before December 31," and there was no significant
political judgment which could support a legislative choice requiring a preDecember 31 filing. The Court held that dates have a plain meaning. It was
the legislature's responsibility to be more careful, not the court's job to rescue
Congress from its error.
What is a court's role in correcting drafting errors from a law-making
responsibility perspective? The argument for enforcing the drafting error as
written views textual accuracy as one of the legislature's primary responsibilities. The text is what legislators pass, and political language should therefore
be respected, even if in a particular case it seems mindless. Indeed, texts are
so important that the court should encourage legislative responsibility by not
bailing out the legislature when it makes careless mistakes. Moreover, the
court cannot be trusted to pierce the textual veil only when there are obvious
careless mistakes. Disrespect for the text will encourage the judicial reader to
undermine the text through a variety of techniques, such as speculating about
legislative purpose, even when the statute is not carelessly drafted.
A strong counterargument can be made that the legis'lature's primary task
is to deal with political controversy When there is no political dispute and the
drafting error is clear, judicial correction of a drafting error does not
undermine the appropriate balance of law-making responsibility between
courts and legislatures. Indeed, preventing mindless harm is an affirmative
judicial responsibility When a legislature carelessly harms someone through
a drafting error, the court has a responsibility to go beyond the text's plain

51. 471 U.S. 84 (1985).
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meaning. Moreover, it is naive to expect that judicial refusal to correct
errors will improve the legislative drafting process, given the pressures under
which drafters already work.
2. Change and Political Responsibility
In 1935, Wisconsin adopted a statute exempting a farmer's "mower" from
creditors' claims. Thereafter the haybine was invented, which did what the old
mower did plus the additional task of binding the hay Was the haybine a
"mower"9 Judge Easterbrook acknowledged that the plain meaning of the
statute had been shattered by change and that the court must consider whether
the new haybine was included in the old statutory term "mower."53 But why
does the court have that responsibility?
Judge Easterbrook discussed three legislative purposes to decide whether the
haybine is a "mower" (1) that something functioning like a mower should be
exempt; (2) that basic farm implements should be free from creditors' claims;
and (3) that the respective interests of debtors and creditors should be
balanced. 4 In his analysis, he relied on the first two purposes (that mowerlike machines and basic farm implements should be exempt), but not the third
(the debtor/creditor balance).
He concluded that the term "mower" includes the modem haybine, because
the newer farm implement served the same function as a mower, in both the
physical sense of mowing and the political sense of exempting basic farm
implements. But why did he reach this conclusion? Given his reluctance to
update statutes, 5 why didn't he limit the word "mower" to its historical
denotative meaning, rejecting an interpretation which included a machine that
did more than the mower did in 193596 Why did he consider the mower's

52. Judge Posner's argument suggests that Justice Stevens' dissent in Locke, 471 U.S. at 125, has
much to recommend it. RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION
256 (1988). See also Judge Posner's opinion in Central States v. Lady Baltimore Foods, Inc., 960 F.2d
1339, 1345 (7th Cir.) (holding that "before January 12" means "on January 12" when the statute had
no other function except to provide a benefit to one taxpayer who acted on January 12), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 179 (1992).
See generally Recent Case, Statutory Construction-DraftingErrors-D.C.CircuitDeclaresSection
192 of the National Bank Act Invalid, 105 HARV. L. REV. 2116 (1992) (discussing a case which
interpreted the law to include a drafting error omitting a statutory provision, even though the mistake
was obvious and the relevant administenng agency and public audience assumed there was no
omission).

53. In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1987).
54. Id. at 1094.
55. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23.
56. A word's meaning can be limited to facts which exist when the word was first used. Compare
People ex rel. Fyfe v. Barnett, 150 N.E. 290 (11. 1925) (holding that women, even after they had
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physical operation and the protection of basic farm implements from creditors,
but refuse to evaluate how the statutory balance between creditor and debtor
applied to the haybine? A law-making responsibility perspective provides an
answer.
Balancing the interests of creditors and debtors in the context of the modem
haybine requires judges to do the following: consider the value of a farmer's
assets as they change over time, which is administratively difficult; determine
the true interests of debtors in exemptions, given the fact that an exemption
may discourage an initial granting of credit; and re-create the historical
legislature's balancing of the respective interests of creditors and debtors,
which is a difficult political judgment call. These judgments might plausibly
be left to legislative law making. They involve complex and difficult political
choices.
By contrast, it is not so difficult to decide that a haybine does what a
mower does and that defining a "mower" to include a haybine serves the
statutory purpose of protecting basic farm implements from creditors.
Moreover, limiting a statutory term like "mower" to its historical denotative
meaning would require legislatures to revisit a statute every time new facts
arise, which is a poor way to allocate law-making responsibility Somejudicial
law-making responsibility is, as a practical matter, desirable. It is especially
appropriate when the facts to which the statute might be applied did not exist
at the time of the statute's adoption. In such cases, the legislature has not
ducked its law-making responsibility " Admittedly, equating a haybine with
a mower, when the haybine does more than the mower and is much more
expensive, might unsettle the legislature's decision to balance debtor and
creditor interests. That is why Easterbrook's decision displays all the anguish
of a judge who would rather not decide the case: "This statute needs
58
legislative attention; we cannot provide more than emergency care
But the alternative of forcing legislatures continually to revisit old statutes is
the greater of two evils in the allocation of law-making responsibility

become eligible to vote, were not included within a statute which defined potential jurors as voters
because the statute was passed before women were given the right to vote) with Commonwealth v.
Maxwell, 114 A. 825 (Penn. 1921) (contra).
57. See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 26 (1931) (holding that statute refermng to "selfpropelled vehicle" did not apply to airplanes although airplanes were well known when the statute was
passed).
58. In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090, 1095 (7th Cir. 1987).
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3. Trumping the Text
Even the most confirmed textualist concedes that an absurd result trumps
the text. "Absurdity" refers to the statute's substantive content; it does not
mean textual gibberish, and it is not limited to cases in which the plain
meaning would nullify the statute. 9 In such cases, the legislature does not
exhaust law-making responsibility through the text. The court has the
responsibility to prevent absurd results, and the legislature has the responsibility to say that the absurdity was really intended, notwithstanding the statute's
plain meaning."
This category of cases is important because it qualifies the claim that the
legislature always has the responsibility to say what it means. Once the
absurdity exception is conceded, the underlying issues of law-making
responsibility must be confronted. Why shouldn't the legislature be held
responsible for writing texts which avoid absurd substantive results? Although
"absurdity" might be a clear enough standard to restrain judicial discretion,
it might also place judges on the slippery slope towards judicial law making,
by acknowledging that the plain meaning of the text is not paramount and by
requiring courts to identify substantive policies that prevail over the text.
Some absurd results can be avoided by arguing that the text, properly
understood, is not absurd. The famous Wittgenstein example, that telling a
child to play a "game" excludes gambling, may be such a case .6 I But
extensive debate about whether the text does or does not produce absurd
results usually ducks the critical question: Where does law-making responsibility lie? The famous Holy Trinity62 case is an example. The issue in Holy
Trinity was whether a statute making it a crime to import aliens to perform
"labor or service" applied to a rector. Every attempt to rewrite the text was
unavailing. "Labor" might be limited to manual labor, but "service" is
broader. "Service" could refer only to domestic household labor, but that is
doubtful. The statute itself refers to "labor or service of any kind."' 63 The text
also excludes skilled workers and nonmanual laborers in certain situations,
which compounds the difficulty of limiting the text to manual labor. It is more
honest to confront the fact that a text's plain meaning must sometimes be
trumped to avoid its substantive impact and that resolving the confrontation
59. See Cabell v. Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 738-39 (2d Cir.) (holding that a plain-meaning
interpretation would make the statute inoperative), aff'd, 326 U.S. 404 (1945).
60. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527-29 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
61. LUDWIG WrrTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 33 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1972).
62. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
63. Id. at 458 (emphasis added).
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depends on the respective law-making responsibilities of legislatures and
courts.
IV. ACCEPTING LAW-MAKING RESPONSIBILITY
Explaining writer- and text-based approaches to statutory interpretation from
a reader-based perspective does not necessarily give judges much to do. The
"conservative" judicial reader might decide that the judge has just enough
law-making responsibility to limit the court's interpretive role. The "conservative" judge would therefore admit to exercising a significant law-making
choice by deferring to the legislative writer or the statutory text, 4 but
thereafter would withdraw from law making, like Ulysses ordenng himself to
be tied to the mast.
Judges are unlike Ulysses, however, because they must remain engaged in
the decision-making process; they must come ashore. Their law-making
responsibility cannot stop with the adoption of writer- and text-based
approaches, but must confront the interaction of statute, facts, and background
considerations to decide the case. That is why Easterbrook, confronted by the
modem haybine, had to choose whether or not to extend the statute's reach
beyond the historical "mower" in light of various statutory purposes. Judge
Easterbrook could not adhere to ProfessorEasterbrook's advice about limiting
the judge's role. 6' The nature of judging and, therefore, the judge's constitutional role in deciding cases require that judges remain so engaged.
Two sets of rules-plain statement rules, and the rule in which legislative
reenactment and inaction incorporates intervening judicial and agency
interpretations-illustrate how judges exercise law-making responsibility
beyond that which is implicit in adopting a writer- or text-based Article I
approach.
A. Plain Statement Rules
A plain statement rule (in its strongest version) rejects interpretation of a
statute that overrides substantive values embodied in the rule, unless the
statute explicitly so provides. Not even a general text is sufficient to override
those values. In weaker versions of a plain statement rule, substantive values
enter into the mix of text, purpose, and background considerations to break

64. See Easterbrook, supra note 22, at 549-51 (arguing that 19th-century liberalism and judicial
shortcomings justify limiting the court's interpretive role).
65. See supra text accompanying notes 53-58.
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ties or to raise the burden of proof before the judge interprets a statute as
rejecting a specific substantive value.
Statutory interpretation has known many plain statement requirements,
although it is not always clear how strong a version the court imposes. They
66
include narrow interpretation of statutes in derogation of common law;
application of the rule of lenity regarding penal statutes; 67 and the interpretation of tax statutes to favor taxpayers. 6' Recent attention has focused on the
plain statement rule against burdening the states.69
Plain statement rules are usually not Article I approaches to statutes in
court. By definition, they do not defer to the statutory text. But neither are
they likely to defer to probable legislative intent (except perhaps in some
applications of the rule of lemty).7" They embody strong substantive values
whose rejection can only be achieved explicitly, regardlessof the legislature's
probable intent. As Justice Scalia notes: "[O]ur jurisprudence abounds with
rules of 'plain statement,' 'clear statement,' and 'narrow construction'
designed variously to ensure that, absent unambiguous evidence of Congress's
intent, extraordinary constitutional powers are not invoked, or important
constitutional protections eliminated, or seemingly inequitable doctrines
applied."'"
If plain statement rules are not Article I approaches to statutory interpretation (that is, if they are not deferential to the legislature), what is their origin?
They fit easily within an Article III approach; the judge exercises law-making
responsibility to force the legislature to make certain decisions carefully They
are applications of a deliberative model of legislation, whereby a statute
overrules certain substantive values only if it results from careful legislative
consideration, evidenced by an explicit statutory text.

66. See generallyJefferson B. Fordham & J. Russell Leach, Interpretationof Statutes in Derogation
of the Common Law, 3 VAND. L. REV. 439 (1950); Barbara Page, Statutes in Derogation of Common
Law: The Canon as an Analytical Tool, 1956 Wis. L. REV.78.
67. See 3 SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 7, § 59.03.
Compare United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931 (1988) (applying the rule of lenity since the crime
of holding workers in involuntary servitude was not proven by a showing of psychological coercion)
with Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992) (interpreting federal Hobbs Act to apply to bribery
of state officials although dissent would apply rule of lenity).
68. 3 SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra note 7, § 66.01.
69. See infra text accompanying notes 73-83.
70. When substantive values influence statutory interpretation on an ad hoc basis, rather than
through a general plain statement rule, they are more likely to identify legislative intent accurately. See,
e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465-72 (1892) (holding that
commitment to religion precludes interpretation of statute cnminalizing importation of rector from
England to the United States).
71. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S.Ct 2608, 2633 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part).
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The exercise of judicial law-making responsibility through plain statement
rules is an obvious threat to Article I writer- and text-based approaches to
statutory interpretation. An attempt is therefore made to minimize this threat
by grounding at least some plain statement rules in constitutionally inspired
values.72 First, a constitutional source is supposed to give the rules a
superior legal pedigree, not traceable to judicial choices. Second, the scope
for judicial law making is reduced because a constitutional source guarantees
widespread judicial agreement. Of course, neither argument works very well,
and for the same reason-the constitutional source of the plain statement rules
is too uncertain to confine judicial choice.
But there is a more fundamental problem with the claim that plain statement
rules are grounded in the Constitution. Constitutional inspiration for a plain
statement rule is different from interpreting a statute to avoid potential
unconstitutionality There is, for example, no doubt that a federal statute can
burden states by abolishing state sovereign immunity, but a plain statement
rule nonetheless requires that this be done explicitly 73 Drawing inspiration
from the Constitution requires the judge to make choices that extend well
beyond the uncertainty of constitutional interpretation, explicitly recognizing
that judges can imply that which the Constitution does not require.
Plain statement rules against burdening the states illustrate how judges must
take responsibility for interpretive choices. First, the core plain statement rule
against burdening states preserves state sovereign immunity in federal court
and is based on federalism principles inferred from the Eleventh Amendment. 74 Federalism principles conflict, however, with values embodied in the
Supremacy Clause affirming the application of federal law The plain
statement rule reflects judicial choice to favor federalism principles. 5
Second, when the issue involves the state as a defendant, but not state

72. See supra text accompanying note 70.
73. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238-40 (1985). Congress has several times
explicitly rejected Court decisions relying on plain statement rules. After the decision in Atascadero,
Congress overrode the result in the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, §
1003, 100 Stat. 1807, 1845 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.). Then, in Dellmuth
v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223 (1989), the Court applied the plain statement rule in another state sovereign
immunity case, which Congress overrode in the Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of
1990, Pub. L. 101-476, § 103, 104 Stat. 1103, 1106 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.). See generally William N. Eskndge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-ConstitutionalLaw: Clear
Statement Rules as ConstitutionalLawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992).
74. "The Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
"
equity, commenced or prosecuted against any of the United States by Citizens of another State
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment has been interpreted to prohibit suits by citizens
against their own state in federal court. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I (1890).
75. See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247-48 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (rejecting the view that the
Eleventh Amendment is grounded in "principles essential to the structure of our federal system").
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sovereign immunity in federal court, judges make different choices about how
much inspiration to draw from constitutionally based federalism principles.
For example, when the question was whether a federal statute provided a
cause of action against the states, Justice White (in dissent) denied that the
Eleventh Amendment was implicated,76 even though he agreed with the
majority in Atascadero about applying a plain statement rule against
overriding state sovereign immunity in federal court. When the issue was
whether state sovereign immunity applies in state court proceedings, a
majority of the Court adhered to precedent and interpreted a federal statute to
reject state sovereign immunity " The Court rejected the view that the
Constitution supported a plain statement rule protecting states when the
proceedings were in state court.78 The dissent argued, however, that such a
plain statement rule "protects the balance of power between the States and the
Federal Government struck by the Constitution" and that "[a]lthough the
Eleventh Amendment spells out one aspect of that balance of power, the
principle of79federalism underlying the amendment pervades the constitutional
structure.
When the state is not a defendant but federal law might interfere with the
states, judicial law-making choices are even more apparent. First, despite
frequent application of plain statement rules to protect the states, the Court
recently applied a federal statute to intrude into what the dissent called "a
field traditionally policed by state and local laws-acts of public corruption
by state and local officials."8 " The Court interpreted the Hobbs Act to cover
bribery of state officials, disregarding the dissent's invocation of federalism
principles to deny federal coverage. 8 ' Second, when pre-emption of state law
is the issue, Justice Scalia is willing to imply pre-emption, 2 despite his
enthusiastic adherence to plain statement rules against burdening the states.8 3

76. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 48 n.14 (1981) (White, J., dissenting
in part).
77. See Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 560 (1991).
78. Id. at 566.
79. Id. at 567 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
80. Evans v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1881, 1901 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
81. Id. at 1901-03.
82. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 112 S.Ct. 2608, 2632 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part); cf.Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988)
(infemng private defense contractor's immunity from suit based on analogy to federal sovereign
immunity).
83. Justice Scalia joined the dissent in Evans, 112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992), objecting to interpreting the
federal Hobbs Act to cover bribery of state officials; he also joined the dissent in Hilton v. South
Carolina Pub. Ry. Comm'n, 112 S.Ct. 560 (1991), objecting to interpretation of federal law to ovemde
state sovereign immunity in state courts.
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Justice Stevens would invoke a plain statement rule against additional preemption of state law when the statute already contains an express pre-emption
clause,"4 despite his dissenting view that a plain statement is not required to
override state sovereign immunity in federal court.8 5
In sum, plain statement rules about burdening the states cannot be traced to
an easy-to-apply constitutional pedigree, but instead function as judicially
chosen reader-based background considerations for interpreting statutes.
Relying on constitutional inspiration is not simply an example of judges
engaging in uncertain constitutional interpretation, but reflects judicial choices
about when the Constitution inspires what it does not require.
Constitutional cover is, moreover, unavailable for the many plain statement
rules which are not constitutionally inspired. Such rules include interpreting
statutes to favor Indians,8 6 preserving the common law,87 and applying "the
canon that provisions for benefits to members of the Armed Services are to
be construed in the beneficiaries' favor."88 Some of these plain statement
rules may be of the weaker tie-breaker or burden-of-proof variety, resolving
close cases or making it harder to prove that the statute impinges on
substantive values embodied in the rules.8 9 Weak or strong, however, plain
statement rules derive from the judge's decision to ask the legislature whether
it really means to reject certain substantive values.
B. Legislative Reenactment and Inaction
The legislative reenactment and inaction doctrines state that an intervening
interpretation of a statute by a court or agency becomes law following
statutory reenactment or legislative inaction. These doctrines are often
criticized, with good reason, on the ground that legislative intent to ratify
intervening interpretations cannot be inferred from reenactment or inaction. 90

84. Cipollone, 112 S. Ct. at 2618 (plurality opinion).

85. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 247 (1985).
86. County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 247-48 (1985).
87. See supra note 66.
88. King v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 112 S. Ct. 570, 574 n.9 (1991) (Souter, J.).
89. The "derogation of common law" canon probably operated this way in early workers'
compensation cases in deciding how to interpret "ansing out of and in the course of employment." See
Sutter v. Kalamazoo Stove & Furnace Co., 297 N.W. 475, 477 (Mich. 1941); Wagner v. La Salle
Foundry Co., 75 N.W.2d 866, 871-72 (Mich. 1956), overruled by Remink v. Van Loozenoord, 121
N.W.2d 689 (Mich. 1963). The pro-veteran canon is also probably of the weaker variety. King, 112 S.
Ct. at 574 n.9.
90. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construingthe Sounds of
Congressionaland ConstitutionalSilence, 57 IND. L.J. 515 (1982); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling
Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L. REv. 1361 (1988).
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The legislature is often unaware of judicial and agency interpretations and, in
any event, it is difficult to interpret reenactment or inaction as legislative
approval." Reenactment often focuses on issues that were not the subject of
the intervening interpretation, 92 and there are too many possible reasons for
legislative inaction.93
Nonetheless, the persistence of the reenactment and inaction doctrines needs
explaining. One explanation is cynical. Courts that are too timid to justify
results on other grounds seek a legislative pedigree for their decisions and
therefore claim that legislative reenactment or inaction ratifies an intervening
interpretation. Another explanation, applicable to intervening judicial
decisions, interprets the decisions as examples of super-strong stare decisis for
statutory interpretation; 94 and many cases upholding agency interpretations
could be precursors of a strong Chevron-like5 deference to agency rules.
A "law-making responsibility" perspective suggests yet another way to
explain many of these cases. Statutory interpretation requires judges to decide
how best to allocate institutional law-making responsibility Many difficult
interpretive issues are technically complex or politically controversial. If there
is genuine awareness of an issue within the legislature, the court might
reasonably decide that it is the legislature's responsibility to decide whether
to reject intervening judicial or agency interpretations,
relying on the
96
reenactment or inaction doctrines to achieve that result.
1. Politically Controversial Agency Interpretation
In Bob Jones University v. United States,97 the the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) had issued rules denying tax exemption to schools which
discriminated on the basis of race. Congress was very aware of these

91. See Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair Corp., 154 F.2d 785, 790-91 (2d Cir.), affd, 328

U.S. 275 (1946).
92. United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 149 & 149 n.12 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
93. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 672 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that possible reasons for legislative inaction include: inability to agree upon how to alter the status quo;
unawareness of the status quo; indifference to the status quo; or political cowardice).
94. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., InterpretingLegislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REv. 67,
118 (1988).
95. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
96. Sometimes the legislature has the responsibility to make certain decisions, regardless of
awareness. That seems to be Justice Stevens' point in St. Martin Evangelical Lutheran Church v. South
Dakota, 451 U.S. 772, 791 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Congress has a special duty to choose its
words carefilly when it is drafting technical and complex laws; we facilitate our work as well as that
of Congress when we adhere closely to the statutory text in [such] cases.").
97. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
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controversial rulings; numerous bills overturning the rulings had died in
committee. Two conventional approaches to interpreting the statute were
unavailable. First, the agency rules were not regulations and were therefore
not entitled to the usual deference accorded agency rulemaking. Second,
legislative inaction in the face of the agency rules could not be equated with
legislative approval; the committees where the bills were bottled up might
have been to the-political left of Congress. But the issue bristled with political
controversy; the government had filed a brief opposing the IRS position.9"
In that context, it made sense for the Court to rely heavily on the inaction
doctrine.99 Given heightened legislative awareness of such a politically
controversial subject, the Court could reasonably decide to let the agency rule
stand, unless the legislature exercised its responsibility to reject the agency
position.
2. Politically Controversial Judicial Interpretation
The classic statement of the reenactment doctrine involving both a
politically controversial issue and prior judicial interpretation appears in Chief
Justice Stone's dissent in Girouardv. United States.0 The case involved
reenactment of the naturalization laws after the Court had interpreted them to
require a naturalized citizen to take an oath committing him or her to bear
arms in defense of the country Chief Justice Stone relied explicitly on the
concept of legislative responsibility, stating:
It is the responsibility of Congress, in reenacting a statute, to make
known its purpose in a controversial matter of interpretation of its former
language, at least when the matter has, for over a decade, been persistently
brought to its attention
In any case it is not lightly to be implied that
Congress has failed to perform [that duty] and has delegated to this Court
the responsibility of giving new content to language deliberately readopted
after this Court has construed it.
M
T

98. Id. at 585 n.9 (noting that government says IRS. lacks authority to issue ruling denying tax
exemption).
99. Id. at 599-601. The Court also emphasized that the statute incorporated common-law public
policy standards into the tax exemption rules. Id. at 585-96. The problem for the Court was that the
literal text allowed exemption disjunctively for "charitable" or "educational" institutions, but its holding
imposed public policy standards on both categories.
For Justice Powell, though, legislative acquiescence was of "critical importance." Id. at 607 (Powell,
J., concurring in part and concurrng in the judgment).
100. 328 U.S. 61, 70 (1946).
101. Id. at 76 (emphasis added).
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3. Technically Complex Agency Interpretation
American Automobile Association v. United States 2 is an example of
deferring to the legislature on a technical tax issue after an intervening agency
interpretation and legislative inaction. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue
refused to allow the taxpayer to use a method of accounting that deferred tax
on prepaid membership dues. The Court upheld the agency's decision, relying
on the fact
that Congress has long been aware of the problem this case presents.
Congress has authorized the desired accounting only in the instance of
prepaid subscription income
It has refused to enlarge [this provision]
to include prepaid membership dues. At the very least, this background
indicates congressional recognition of the complications inherent in the
problem and its seriousness to the general revenue. We must leave to the
Congress the fashioning of a rule which, in any event, must have wide
ramifications. The Committees of the Congress have standing committees
103
expertly grounded in tax problems

On such technically complex issues of which "Congress has long been aware,"
rejection of the agency rule is the legislature's responsibility

4. Technically Complex Judicial Interpretation
04
Justice Black's dissent in James v. United States1
argues explicitly that
the legislature is responsible for rejecting an intervening judicial decision of
which it was aware when it dealt with a technical tax issue (whether
embezzlement income is exempt from income tax). Justice Black stated:

All of us know that the House and Senate Committees responsible for our
tax laws keep a close watch on judicial rulings interpreting the Internal
Revenue Code. Each committee has one or more experts at its constant
disposal. It cannot possibly be denied that these committees and these
experts are, and have been, fully familiar with the [Court's decision
exempting embezzlement income].
In the Eighty-sixth Congress and in
the present Eighty-seventh Congress bills have been introduced to subject
embezzled funds to income taxation. They have not been passed. This is
not an instance when we can say that Congress may have neglected to
102. 367 U.S. 687 (1961).
103. Id. at 697.
104. 366 U.S. 213 (1961).
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change the law because it did not know what was going on in the courts
What we have here instead is a case in which Congress has not
passed bills that have been introduced to make embezzled funds taxable
105

A judicial decision to allocate law-making responsibility to the legislature
makes sense when the legislature is aware of a technically complex or
politically controversial issue. Rather than approving prior judicial or agency
interpretations of a statute, through stare decisis or deference to agency rules,
the court takes a middle position. Judges allocate law-making responsibility
to the legislature so it may decide whether the intervening judicial or agency
interpretation is good law, while the issue is on the legislative agenda. If, at
a later date, the legislature stops paying attention to the issue, the court may
then properly reconsider how the statute should be interpreted.
The Court expressed such a wait-and-see attitude in a constitutional case
involving the Commerce Clause. 0 6 The Court decided to follow prior
precedent which prohibited state requirements that out-of-state sellers collect
tax on mail order purchases. It noted that Congress has both the power and
superior competence to solve the problem, and that Congress may have
withheld action because it mistakenly thought the Due Process Clause
prohibited it. These considerations strengthened the Court's view that it
should "withhold[] [its] hand, at least for now"'' 7 and let Congress act.
When a court decides that legislative awareness in reenactment and inaction
cases justifies support for an intervening interpretation, it often decides, at
least for the present time, to leave technically complex or politically
08
controversial issues to the legislature.1
CONCLUSION
Predictions about the future of statutory interpretation are hazardous. We
cannot anticipate the politics of elected officials who appoint federal judges.
Although political contingencies might be overwhelmed by legal culture, it is
difficult to prophesy how the legal culture will evolve.

105. Id. at 230-32 (emphasis added).
106. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 112 S. Ct. 1904, 1916 (1992).
107. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981)
(White, J., concurring)).
108. Cf General Motors v. Simmons, 558 S.W.2d 855, 863 (Tex. 1977) (deciding not to adopt
comparative negligence in strict liability cases but "respectfully invit[ing] further legislative study"). The
Texas House responded by adopting comparative negligence for strict liability in 1981, but the bill failed
in the Senate. Then, in 1984, the court adopted pure comparative negligence in strict liability cases.
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).

1993]

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

Forced to predict, I see textualism's recent ascendance as temporary Its
current prominence is due in part to the inability of all writer-based
approaches to explain what a legislature has done. Under scrutiny, however,
the statutory text will prove too fragile to survive as the paramount criterion
of statutory meaning. Uncertainties about defining the text's audience, the
pressures of change, the problem of legislative errors, and the questionable
assumptions that underlie surface textualism will render text-based approaches
suspect.
Public choice and textualist approaches will nonetheless have an impact,
fueled in large part by suspicion of both legislative and judicial law making.
Deferring to legislative bargains will not be systematically dismissed as the
perspective of a "cynical political observer."' 9 Plain meaning (but not
surface) textualism will seem attractive, not primarily because it implements
the likely intent of author and audience, but because it provides a fallback
position for judges who are not confident about enlarging on legislative
purpose. Somewhat chastened by public choice, textualism, and their own
self-doubts, judges will be unable to return enthusiastically to the "reasonableness" approach of Legal Process, but will instead search for new ways to
justify their reader-based role in statutory interpretation.
The crystal ball begins to fade at this point, but I expect law-making
responsibility to be the organizing principle around which judges define the
interaction of writer, text, and judicial reader. The imperatives of judging
force the judge to acknowledge that all approaches to statutory interpretation
depend on theories about law-making responsibility, determining who should
decide what issues and when.

109. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.

